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Democracies are perceived often by the public as relatively docile and
not suited best for wars. This paper challenges this perception by
analyzing the relationship between regime type and war outcomes. It
builds upon David Lake’s 1992 model in “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic
States and War” by updating it to the present period. It examines the
empirical evidence and scholarly debate in order to test and elaborate on
the argument that democratic states in the modern era are more prone
to fighting and winning wars. This paper, furthermore, adds a number of
new variables to the Lake model to analyze the possibility that more
factors are needed in the equation to better understand regime type and
war outcomes. This research finds that regime type and alliances are
significant variables in winning wars and that democracies win the large
majority (84%) of wars that they are involved in. The paper concludes
with recommendations for further research.
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Introduction 
Democracies and war have been a major research topic for scholars in the last several decades. 
For centuries, it was a commonly held view that democracies were weak in prosecuting wars. It 
has only been recently that scholars have begun to test the democracies and war equation. The 
general public tends to assume that democracies act only defensively and rarely keep count on 
the number of conflicts. With the end of the Cold War, scholars have become more determined 
to analyze the “Free World’s” power and decisiveness. These scholars have begun to put 
together all the wars since the 19th century and argue that democracies are not only war-prone 
but also highly successful in fighting wars. This is in stark contrast to prior popular beliefs and 
perceptions. 
 
This research paper builds upon current scholarship on democracies and war. It focuses on the 
question as to how well democracies fight wars, using statistical analysis. This paper applies 
David Lake’s 1992 “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War” as the foundation to test the 
empirical evidence. After reviewing briefly the scholarly literature, Lake’s model is updated 
from 1988 to 2008. This version adds five new wars that involved democracies and changes the 
total number of participants from 121 to 168. Following the analysis, this paper incorporates nine 
new independent variables that expand the analysis and evaluation of what may affect conflicts 
and outcomes. It is important to note that this research project is currently an exploratory 
analysis on a very important topic. It lays down the foundations for much more extensive 
theoretical studies on democracies and war. It first seeks to determine the prospects for more in-
depth and comprehensive research within the parameters set by Lake and, then, attempts to 
expand the framework for possible greater insights and future scientific studies. The paper 
concludes with a number of recommendations for future research. 
 
Historical Overview 
Democracies used to be described as peace-loving and just. Immanuel Kant, in Perpetual Peace 
(1795), stated that democracies represented the people’s will and the people often sought to 
avoid wars unless absolutely necessary. Kant argued that democracies will naturally form what 
he called a “league of peace” and that this alliance would eventually become strong enough to 
eliminate war as an instrument of resolving conflicts.1 Many new democracies have been 
established since Kant’s assertions, and no major wars have occurred between them. Scholars, 
nevertheless, point out that democracies go to war quite often and the type of government is not 
conclusive in predicting future conflict participation.2 
                                                             
1
 Kant, Immanuel, Perpetual Peace (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1957). 
2
 See scholarly works such as David J. Singer and Melvin Small, “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 
1815-1965,” Jerusalem Journal of Conflict Resolution 1:1 (1976): 50-69; Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal 
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12 (Fall 1983): 323-353; Michael W. Doyle, 
“Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part II,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12 (Fall 1983): 323-353; 
Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80:4 (December 1986): 
1151-1169; Erich Weede, “Democracy and War Involvement,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (December 1984): 
649-664; Steve Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall…: Are the Free Countries More Pacific?” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 28 (December 1984): 617-648; Bruce Russett, “Can a Democratic Peace Be Built?” 
International Interactions 18:3 (1993): 277-282; Russett, Bruce, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a 
Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Russett, Bruce, Hegemony and  
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Throughout most of history, democracy and war were equated with military defeat and 
destruction. When the ancient and authoritarian Spartans defeated democratic Athens in the 
Peloponnesian War in the 5th century BC, democracy was labeled as weak and divisive. People 
were told that although democracy may be a good system theoretically and politically, 
democracy was not strong enough to maintain sufficiently homeland security and prosecute wars 
successfully. With the creation of the United States and other democracies, these countries 
challenged the notion that security was more important than political freedom. America’s 
Founders, furthermore, had a lifetime of experiences in war. They made sure that the United 
States had a representative government—a republic—and not a pure democracy like ancient 
Athens. They incorporated a powerful central government in the Constitution in order to give the 
new nation a political system that was capable of protecting the people from external threats 
while not posing a serious danger to people’s rights and freedoms. With the great expansion of 
democracy in the 20th century, there has been much more evidence to test the democracies and 
war proposition. Since the creation of the United States, democracies have fought many wars 
against autocracies. Scholars, thus, have posed the question as to how well democracies fight 
wars.3 
 
Brief Scholarly Review 
The common perception is that authoritarian regimes are war-prone and the sole culprits in 
initiating wars. However, it was not until the 1980s that there were a significant number of 
scholars willing to challenge this premise. Michael Doyle, Erich Weede, Steve Chan, and others 
argued that there is no definitive evidence proving that democracies are more pacific.4 Weede, in 
fact, states that there have been times in which democracies have been led to war by their 
impassioned publics.5 Doyle declares that the “historical liberal legacy is laden with popular 
wars fought to promote freedom, to protect private property, or to support liberal allies against 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2011); Randolph M. Siverson, “Democracies and War Participation: In Defense 
of the Institutional Constraints Argument,” European Journal of International Relations 1:4 (1995): 481-489; 
Reiter, Dan and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Dan Reiter and 
Allan C. Stam, “Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation,” American Political 
Science Review 97:2 (May 2003): 333-337; Rousseau, David, Democracy and War: Institutions, Norms,  
and the Evolution of International Conflict (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
3
 Many of the writings and conversations by the Founders, especially in The Federalist Papers, emphasize the need 
for a compromise between democracy and a strong government that can maintain sufficient security and not go the 
way of ancient Athens. See previous citations for further elaboration on American democracy and government war 
powers and outcomes. See also Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Translated by Richard Crawley and Revised 
With an Introduction by T. E. Wick (New York: Random House, 1982); Kenneth N. Waltz, “Kant, Liberalism,  
and War,” American Political Science Review 56:2 (June 1962): 331-340; Brown, Michael E., Owen  
R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Do Democracies Win Their Wars?: An International 
Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011); Brown, Michael E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. 
Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Alexander B. Downes, “How 
Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War,” International Security 
33:4 (Spring 2009): 9-51; Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18. 
4
 Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I”; Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 
Part II”; Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics”; Weede, “Democracy and War Involvement”; Chan, “Mirror, 
Mirror on the Wall…: Are the Free Countries More Pacific?”. 
5
 Weede, “Democracy and War Involvement,” 652-653. 
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nonliberal enemies.”6 Moreover, Chan concludes that there is no substantial evidence that 
democratic governments are more restrained from going to war, especially against non-
democratic states.7 
 
With the end of the Cold War in 1989, David Lake, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, Michael Desch, 
and others continued to analyze the democracies and war topic but with much more empirical 
evidence and statistical computer programs at their disposal.8 They built upon previous studies 
questioning the pacifism of democracies and emphasized wartime success. The Cold War’s 
positive ending combined with victories in WWI and WWII suggested that democracies may 
actually be stronger than authoritarian regimes. Post-Cold War scholars came up with a number 
of explanations as to why democracies can be stronger than authoritarian regimes, including but 
not limited to: the existence of a free market; having greater popular support; a willingness to 
sacrifice economically and militarily, especially in wars of necessity/survival; maintaining a 
more conducive environment for economic and technological development; being more able to 
establish long-term, stable alliances between democracies and even authoritarian regimes; having 
a more educated and skilled civilian and military population; political leaders who are more 
vulnerable for removal if success is not achieved; being more absolute and impassioned to 
convert by force non-democracies; perceptual constraints towards democratic and authoritarian 
challengers; having a large private arms industry that can sell to their own country and world; 
and, having a greater demand and political willingness for continued economic expansion in 
order to maintain the country’s standard of living and capitalism.9 
 
Research Data and Methods: The Original Study 
David Lake was one of the first to test empirically the idea of democracies fighting and winning 
wars. In “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” Lake examined thirty wars and 121 
military participants from 1816-1988 (N=121).10 Lake used the Correlates of War (COW) project 
(Singer and Small) to establish a pool of military conflicts and their participants and, then, he 
used Polity data (Gurr) to determine whether or not a democracy was involved in the war (see 
                                                             
6
 Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” 1160. 
7
 Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall…: Are the Free Countries More Pacific?” 
8
 David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” The American Political Science Review 86:1 
(March 1992): 24-37; Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War, and Michael C. Desch, “Democracy and Victory: Why 
Regime Type Hardly Matters,” International Security 27:2 (Autumn 2002): 5-47. 
9
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, “War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative 
Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability,” American Political Science Review 89:4 (December 1995): 
841-855; Friedberg, Aaron L., In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand 
Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Reiter and Stam,  
Democracies at War; Reiter and Stam, “Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation”; 
Kenneth A. Shultz and Barry R. Weingast, “The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial 
Power in International Competition,” International Organization 57:1 (2003): 3-42; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 
James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “Testing Novel Implications of the Selectorate 
Theory of War,” World Politics 56:3 (2004): 363-388; Jonathan Keller, “Leadership Style, Regime Type, and 
Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior: A Contingent Monadic Peace?” International Studies  
Quarterly 49:2 (2005): 205-231; Geis, Anna, Lothar Brock, and Harald Müller, eds., Democratic Wars: Looking at 
the Dark Side of Democratic Peace (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Reiter, Stam, and Downes, 
“Correspondence: Another Skirmish in the Battle over Democracies and War”; Saunders, Elizabeth N., Leaders at 
War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Russett, 
Hegemony and Democracy. 
10
 Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War.” 
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Appendix for full list of wars with democracies and overall statistics).11 The Polity data covers 
from the 1800s to the present and defines the degree of both democracy and authoritarianism on 
a 0-10 scale (with 0 being the worst and 10 being the best). The overall scale is -10 to 10, with 
the democracy score minus the autocracy score equaling the Polity 2 score. Many scholars have 
used subsequently Polity 2 scores to determine when a democracy went to war, declaring a Polity 
2 score of 6 or greater as the democracy threshold on the 21-point scale, with 10 being a full 
democracy and -10 being a full autocracy. Lake (and others) then took the list of democratic 
participants in war and went further in determining their degree of political freedom in order to 
get a better idea of democracies and war. Lake used the 0-10 point democracy score to establish 
a baseline for political freedom and military effectiveness (with 10 being the most democratic).  
 
Once Lake determined the democratic regimes and the wars they fought in since the 1800s, he 
looked at the outcomes of the wars to see if democracies tended to win or lose wars. Lake found 
thirty wars that democracies fought in between 1816-1988. Of those thirty wars, he concluded 
that twenty-six of the wars had clear winners and losers between democratic and authoritarian 
opponents. What Lake found was that democracies won most of the time, in fact they won 
twenty-one (81 percent) and lost five times (19 percent). Lake’s research concluded that 
democracies have actually been very effective in fighting and winning wars, despite historical 
and even current perceptions to the contrary. Although there are many critics of the Afghanistan 
and Iraq wars, it is important to distinguish between the conventional war period in which Lake 
and others consider as opposed to the post-war occupation and insurgency/terrorism aspects, 
which are a separate category not analyzed.12 
 
The Present Study 
This research paper updates Lake’s study by including all the wars democracies have fought in 
since 1988. It should be noted that Lake’s analysis actually ended with the 1982 Falkland Islands 
War between the United Kingdom and Argentina. All COW and Polity data to 2008 are used to 
extend Lake’s study two decades to the present. The paper incorporates five more wars and 
forty-seven more participants (N=168). It determines the relationship between regime type and 
military victory or defeat by using logit analysis. The dependent variable (DV) is the war 
outcome. Regime type is the independent variable (IV), using the 11-point scale (0-10) for 
democracy in the Polity index. This paper, then, adds a number of new independent variables 
(nine total) to enhance the original and updated analyses and to see if there is more to military 
victory than the degree of democracy. These variables are included to extract more insight into 
possible motivations and outcomes behind democracies fighting wars and to address a number of 
factors that may challenge possible theoretical explanations for the wars, such as ideology, 
capitalism, balance of power, hegemonic stability, geopolitics, etc. Many of the additional 
variables have been postulated by a number of scholars, especially after the Lake study, as being 
                                                             
11
 “Correlates of War Project,” available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org; “Polity Project,”  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity; Singer, J. David, The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models 
(New York: The Free Press, 1980).  
12
 See many of the books and articles on the Afghanistan and, especially, Iraq wars, including Ricks, Thomas E.,  
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); Ferguson, Charles, No End  
in Sight: Iraq’s Descent Into Chaos (New York: Public Affairs, 2008); Clarke, Richard, Your Government  
Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Security Disasters (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008).  
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important factors to consider in any democracy and war equation for causes and outcomes.13 
Moreover, this study establishes a known and consistent standard for scoring countries at war 
that have had their political regimes collapse due to revolution, civil war, and other reasons. 
Lake, in his original study, did not specify how he coded these countries with political 
breakdowns and, in a more recent though brief email exchange with the author, he acknowledged 
that he did not know how he scored these regimes and did not keep any original notes.14 
 
This present study conducted all potential variations and none of these variations produced the 
exact results of Lake’s original study, which means that there probably was an inconsistent 
scoring application. This study, therefore, corrects the situation by determining the best version 
to code regimes in transitional phases during wartime, in order to establish greater consistency in 
future studies. The research follows along the lines of Reiter and Stam and their coding 
methods.15 The coding, specifically, uses the stable democracy score for a regime just prior to the 
war fought, in order to recognize that the original pre-war political regime probably played a 
significant part in the origins of the war and much of its characteristics are likely to have 
remained the following year(s) when war broke out and the regime collapsed, transitioned, or 
was incapacitated.  
 
The five wars that are added for this study combined forty-seven more war participants and 
include the Persian Gulf War (1991), the Bosnian War (1995), the Kosovo War (1999), the 
Afghanistan War (2001), and the Iraq War (2003). All these wars involved democracies (Polity 
II scores of 6 or greater). All five wars included the United States and the United Kingdom. The 
Persian Gulf War had the United States taking the lead against Iraq, with the United Kingdom 
and France contributing significantly, while there were dozens of other countries playing minor 
supporting roles for Desert Storm. The Bosnian and Kosovo Wars involved NATO, which meant 
that sixteen NATO countries in the Bosnian War and nineteen NATO countries (three new 
members entered NATO in 1999) in the Kosovo War participated in military operations against 
Yugoslavia/Serbia. The two most recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq consisted of the United 
States and the United Kingdom carrying out the primary military operations in the wars and 
                                                             
13
 The COW and Polity datasets now include a number of these variables, so the authors clearly believe that the 
variables are important enough to collect the data on and encourage scholars to utilize in their studies and statistical 
equations. See also the citations above, as well as some good studies that focus on a variety of other perspectives 
and variables, including Charles R. Boehmer, “A Reassessment of Democratic Pacifism at the Monadic Level of  
Analysis,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25:1 (2008): 81-94; Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, All 
International Politics Is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization (Ann Arbor, MI: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2005); Robert Latham, “Democracy and War-Making: Locating the International 
Liberal Context,” Millenium 22:1 (1993): 139-164; John R. Oneal, “Confirming the Liberal Peace with Analyses of 
Directed Dyads, 1885-2001,” in Harvey Starr (ed.), Approaches, Levels and Methods of Analysis in International 
Politics: Crossing Boundaries (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 73-94; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett. 
“The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-85,” International Studies 
Quarterly 41:2 (1997): 267-293; Russett, Bruce and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001); Schweller, Randall L.,  
“Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics 44 (January 1992): 235-
269; Weede, Erich, Balance of Power, Globalization, and the Capitalist Peace (Berlin: Liberal Verlag GmbH, 
2005). 
14
 Email correspondence with David A. Lake, May 4, 2010. 
15
 Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War; Email correspondence with Alan C. Stam,  
May 5-6, 2010. 
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other countries playing minor supporting roles during the wars and/or in the post-war operations, 
which became “extra-state” conflicts according to Polity when major combat operations ended. It 
should be pointed out that insurgencies and other solely unconventional conflicts were not 
included in this nor Lake’s study and, thus, were not considered in the dataset outcomes of any 
war after major conventional operations were deemed officially over by Polity and others. Iraq 
and Afghanistan, therefore, are evaluated on the initial conventional war operations and not on 
the relatively low-scale guerrilla warfare responses that followed. Many wars have had 
unconventional resistance after major combat operations but the resistance is not considered 
anywhere near the level of being able to dislodge directly the conventional winner but rather 
meant to slowly exhaust, bleed, and make more uncomfortable and costly the occupation for 
however many years and decades it is necessary to persuade the once-victorious power that it is 
time to go home. 
 
The following statistical model updates and tests Lake’s original equation. 
 
Figure 1: Lake’s Study on Democracies and War—Updated 
 
 
 
The test results in Figure 1 are consistent with Lake’s original study. The results, in fact, provide 
much stronger support for the argument that democracies tend to win wars, with democracies 
winning all five wars that were added from the 1990s to the present. This means that out of the 
thirty-one wars that were considered, democracies won twenty-six of the thirty-one wars (84 
percent), losing just the same five in Lake’s study. 
 
According to the updated results, the z-score is highly significant at 6.17, the p-value is 
significant at 0.000, and the 95 percent Confidence Interval is met. The slope coefficient 
indicates a positive relationship between democracy scores and war outcomes. The overall 
logistical regression model has a Pseudo R2 of 0.2316, which means that the independent 
variable (democracy scores) explains approximately 23 percent of the variance in the dependent 
variable (war outcome), which is relatively significant in this case study. Thus, Lake’s model is 
confirmed, strengthened, and updated. 
 
In order to build upon Lake’s study, this research project adds a number of new independent 
variables to possibly give us a better understanding of wars and regime type. The independent 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.6724508   .2629283    -2.56   0.011    -1.187781   -.1571209
 Democ_Score     .3005334   .0487393     6.17   0.000     .2050061    .3960608
                                                                              
 War_Outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -82.172332                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2316
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =      49.52
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        168
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -82.172332
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -82.172339
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -82.187293
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -83.133389
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -106.93438
. logit War_Outcome Democ_Score
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variables are Contiguity, Regional, Fair Fight, Alliance, Initiator, Duration, Democracy Change, 
Autocracy Change, and Breakdown. Many of these variables have been used in other datasets or 
considered in more qualitative studies before and after Lake’s and have been recognized as 
important potential factors in conflicts and outcomes.16 The variable information and general 
definitions come mainly from COW and Polity, while others are noted. The 
explanations/justifications for using the variables come primarily from this study. The 
democracy/autocracy changes and breakdown variables are new contributions for testing 
(although Polity considers them important enough data to collect), which this investigation is 
eager to determine the results. It has been a long historical question as to whether countries make 
fundamental adjustments to their political structures during wartime in order to win. This study 
examines the data and provides a preliminary analysis of these new variables before 
recommending further detailed research in this matter and the expansion of Lake’s framework. 
 
Contiguity determines whether or not the war participants were neighboring (bordering) 
countries. Contiguity may suggest that geographical proximity and not regime type has more to 
do with wars and their outcomes. 
 
Regional considers whether or not the war participants were within the same region or continent 
as each other. This study has created this variable in order to expand the parameters of the 
Contiguity variable to include countries in close proximity to each other, although not neighbors. 
It acknowledges that transportation technology along with geopolitics make Regional the next 
step away from Contiguity. It also may indicate that a war participant fighting beyond its region 
may be more prone to militarization and imperialism. In other words, it is much harder to justify 
a war as defensive if it is being fought well beyond a country’s region, though it has been done 
before.  
 
Fair Fight refers to Desch’s article and the claim that many of the wars democracies have fought 
in were very unfair fights against much weaker opponents—thus, skewing the war outcome 
results. This independent variable may give us a better understanding of regime type and military 
effectiveness when the war participants are closer to each other’s power, based upon the existing 
military figures, technology, economy, and other key factors. It should be noted that this is a 
relative and somewhat imprecise standard, based primarily on sheer numbers (population, 
military, industrial power, etc.), quality of weaponry, and to some degree perception and an 
element of subjectiveness, although most people would agree with the general assessment based 
upon practical reasoning. This study makes the final assessment on the “fairness” of a war based 
upon the actual combatants, power comparisons, and past historical evaluations of the conflict. 
 
Alliance determines whether or not a war participant, mainly the democracy, was part of a 
military alliance. This variable goes along with the scholarship that suggests that democracies are 
better at making and holding together alliances, especially among other democracies, but also 
including non-democracies. 
 
                                                             
16
 See the previous citations in #11, 13, 2, 3, and 9 to get the full picture of all the different types of variables 
considered in the democracies and war equation. 
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Initiator tells us whether or not the specific war participant started the war. This variable tells us 
who tends to be the aggressor, the democratic or non-democratic state, which is a significant 
distinction. 
 
Duration gives us the length of the war. It is coded in years. It is an important variable to 
consider when many have argued that democracies are weak and divisive and, in the long-term 
wars, will lose and be destroyed eventually. The greater the duration of a war, the more the 
democracy factor may come into play, for better or for worse. This may give us an idea of how 
well and long a democracy can fight a war successfully. 
 
“Democracy Change” is the amount of change that occurs in the Polity democracy score of 0-10 
during the war. It tells us if any of the war participants, especially the democracies, altered their 
political institutions and got tougher or softer during the war. This is the first time that this 
variable has been used in such a manner. It should be noted that the change can only occur with 
wars lasting more than one year, given the yearly (and not monthly) Polity index. All wars of one 
year or less were coded as having zero (0) change. 
 
Autocracy Change is the same as above but with the Polity autocracy score of 0-10 being 
analyzed for any changes during a war of longer than one year. This variable tells us if the 
democratic or non-democratic states became more autocratic the longer a war lasted. If 
democratic states become more autocratic during wartime, then this may suggest that the 
willingness and ability to essentially switch off democracy and fight a war more aggressively, 
which could determine victory in the end, especially in prolonged wars. Whether or not the 
democracy returns afterwards, especially to its original levels, is a whole other case. 
 
Breakdown determines whether or not a war participant had its government collapse at any point 
during the war. This data comes from Polity with specific scores based upon the different types 
of government breakdowns. This variable is another indicator of the strength, weakness, and 
durability of the democratic or autocratic governments involved in the war. This also may have 
an association with the duration of the war. 
 
When the new set of independent variables given above is tested, we come up with the following 
results. 
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Figure 2: New and Expanded Democracy and War Equation  
 
 
The new logistical regression in Figure 2 has a Pseudo R2 of 0.3223, which means that the 
independent variables explain approximately 32 percent of the variance in the dependent variable 
(war outcome). This is significant, especially when compared with previous Pseudo R2 results 
(23 percent) and the fact that the N is now 168. According to this multivariate analysis, the 
democracy score variable continues to remain significant, with a z-score of 4.78, a p-value of 
0.000, and a 95 percent Confidence Interval. The slope coefficient indicates a positive 
relationship between democracy scores and war outcomes.  
 
As for the other new independent variables, only the Alliance variable is significant, with a  
z-score of 3.10, a p-value of 0.002, and a 95 percent Confidence Interval. The Alliance slope 
coefficient indicates a positive relationship between alliances and war outcomes. Since 
democracies have won twenty-six of the thirty-one wars analyzed, these statistical results suggest 
that democratic states who are part of alliances are a very powerful and successful combination 
when it comes to warfare. A brief historical review shows that many countries who were part of 
these winning coalitions were not democratic states, which tells us that the democratic “league of 
peace” that Kant suggested has been expanded (so far, to the present) with democratic and non-
democratic states forming long-term alliances or at least coming together on a case-by-case 
basis. This indicates that democracies are willing to forgo any political moral qualms and align 
with non-democracies if necessary in order to win wars. 
 
The next equation is an abbreviated version of the model above, in order to confirm the results 
and see if a smaller number of variables can alter any of the key variables and, particularly, the 
very-close-to-significant regional variable. 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.3204115   .6495309    -0.49   0.622    -1.593469    .9526457
   Breakdown    -.5515476    .650436    -0.85   0.396    -1.826379    .7232836
Autoc_Change     -.239477   .2700102    -0.89   0.375    -.7686873    .2897332
Democ_Change     -.193754   .3353717    -0.58   0.563    -.8510704    .4635625
    Duration    -.1051989   .1419902    -0.74   0.459    -.3834945    .1730967
   Initiator    -.2088337   .4635514    -0.45   0.652    -1.117378    .6997104
    Alliance     1.563148   .5044885     3.10   0.002     .5743683    2.551927
  Fair_Fight     .0836195   .5633023     0.15   0.882    -1.020433    1.187672
    Regional     -1.74969   1.023732    -1.71   0.087    -3.756169    .2567885
  Contiguity     .5961737   .9390864     0.63   0.526    -1.244402    2.436749
 Democ_Score     .2706769   .0565718     4.78   0.000     .1597983    .3815555
                                                                              
 War_Outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -72.466125                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3223
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(10)     =      68.94
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        168
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -72.466125
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -72.466128
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -72.47188
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -72.779137
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -75.738396
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -106.93438
>  Duration Democ_Change Autoc_Change Breakdown
. logit War_Outcome Democ_Score Contiguity Regional Fair_Fight Alliance Initiator
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Figure 3: Abbreviated Democracy and War Equation 
 
 
The shortened version in Figure 3 confirms the original significance of the democracy score and 
alliance variables, but it also raises the regional variable to significance. The negative direction 
of the regional variable means that many of the victorious wars fought by democracies occurred 
beyond their region and, thus, power projection capabilities were a critical factor in fighting and 
winning the wars. The sizeable distance between combatants suggests colonies, markets and 
natural resources, and/or alliances, among other possible reasons, and less wars of 
necessity/survival. This adds greater depth to the overall explanation as to what conditions lead 
to wars and their final outcomes. Given the insignificance in the previous model, this tells us that 
the regional variable should always be taken seriously in any equation, regardless of the final 
outcome; it appears too close to call. 
 
As for the insignificant variables in all of the equations above, these results are important 
findings in themselves, since they remove a number of explanations as to why democracies win 
wars. The more refined the analysis can be, the better understanding we can have regarding 
democracies and military victory. More studies should be conducted to improve our focus and 
provide us with the most efficient means of capturing and evaluating democratic combatants. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, this updated and expanded study of Lake’s “Powerful Pacifists” is an important means 
of analyzing past research findings, determining their reliability, and then building upon them. It, 
to restate from the beginning, is just an exploratory analysis that evaluates the prospects for 
much more comprehensive theoretical studies in the future using the scientific method. This 
paper confirms Lake’s original model that democracies are much more effective in winning wars 
than non-democracies. It is an important finding, although scholars have produced studies 
suggesting that democracies may be less effective in fighting wars as Lake and others have 
suggested, but they still win nevertheless. This leads us to a compelling scholarly challenge of 
building upon previous research findings in order to prove/disprove them and add to the 
academic knowledge base. This research study supports the claim that the degree of democracy 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.6022799   .5882475    -1.02   0.306    -1.755224    .5506639
    Alliance     1.325211   .4506328     2.94   0.003     .4419872    2.208435
    Regional    -1.970068   .8675452    -2.27   0.023    -3.670426    -.269711
  Contiguity     .8597515   .7761627     1.11   0.268    -.6614995    2.381002
 Democ_Score     .2739717   .0544729     5.03   0.000     .1672068    .3807365
                                                                              
 War_Outcome        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -74.580754                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3026
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(4)      =      64.71
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        168
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -74.580754
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -74.580754
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -74.584069
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -74.82374
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -77.511233
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -106.93438
. logit War_Outcome Democ_Score Contiguity Regional Alliance
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affects strongly war outcomes, from Lake’s time period and then up through the post-Cold War 
period to the present. The additional independent variables that are used in the updated version 
suggest that alliances are a very important contributing factor to war outcomes and, thus, 
encourages further research on the matter. This finding is consistent with other research that 
stress that democracies tend to be much better at working with other countries (democracies or 
non-democracies) and that this ability to be more open and flexible can help establish and 
maintain strong alliances, in order to win wars.  
 
Furthermore, this paper’s other findings lead us to a number of important conclusions. Knowing 
that democracies can win wars beyond their borders and regions highlights the fact that major 
power projection capabilities and, to some degree, diplomatic skills are important in ensuring the 
communication lines from the home country all the way to the enemy. More detailed analytical 
and statistical research is recommended on this issue, although historically and qualitatively this 
has been common sense. The findings also make it clear that the fairness, initiator, and duration 
variables of the war do not play significant roles in most cases in the final war outcomes. The 
findings, moreover, indicate that democracies can win wars, even long wars, without sacrificing 
any significant degree of their political structures and without any political breakdowns in their 
governments. This does not mean that people’s rights may not be limited or infringed upon 
during the war, but the Polity data suggests that no fundamental changes to the political system 
tend to be made during wars. Additional research should be made beyond this study’s specific 
focus on Polity data and general political structures. 
 
This paper contends that war outcomes and regime types provide a very fertile and exciting area 
for future research. More independent variables can be added to Lake’s database in order to test 
additional hypotheses, including state GDP/GNP, level of industrialization, exact distance 
between warring parties, length (lifetime) of a democratic government, location of strategic 
minerals and resources, topography, ocean-access, freshwater availability and consumption 
(particularly in arid regions like Africa and the Middle East), education levels, size and quality of 
particular types of weapons arsenals, power projection capabilities, level of opposition forces 
(peaceful and armed) in one or more rivals, degree of internet accessibility, and other possible 
variables. These independent variables can be defined in greater detail and tested with rigorous 
empirical analysis and statistical formulas. More subjective approaches can be applied at the 
international, state, and individual levels, as well. Research should continue to be updated and 
the latest, cutting edge factors should be incorporated in studies. And, scholars should make a 
greater effort to get out and interact with key national security officials and bureaucracies, 
including the military itself. 
 
In the end, it is a constant search for greater clarity and insight as to how well political systems 
can protect their citizens and win the ultimate contest for survival and military victory. It is a 
debate that has gone on for thousands of years since ancient Athens and Sparta fought. It 
continues to this day with scholars endeavoring to use increasingly powerful evidence and 
instruments to try to resolve finally this bi-millennial debate. This research paper contributes 
only a small part to these efforts, and it fits in to a larger and more vigorous debate on war and 
peace. Much more research needs to be done. But, the value and potential consequences can be 
significant in the policy realm as well as the public debate and perceptions on war. Thus, 
democracies and war should continue to be an intense topic of scholarly analysis and evaluation. 
Dobransky: Democracies and Military Victory
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Finally, no one should underestimate the military power and resolve of democratic countries 
once they go to war. Democracies, clearly, achieve military victory most of the time. Whether or 
not this will influence future international relations and the global structure, mainly driving more 
countries towards freedom, is still unknown. Yet, democracies may be their own worst enemies 
domestically, especially in terms of interfering with their economic and social systems. But, 
militarily they can still extract sufficient power and resources from their populations and private 
industries to make them a force to be reckoned with. If and when the popular and private support 
declines significantly, then democracies are likely to see the full force of their folly on the 
domestic, as well as military, front. Until then, democracies remain the ultimate military powers 
and not the ones that authoritarian regimes really want to go to war with. Times may change. 
Such may be the fate of humanity and its contradictory quests for freedom, domestic welfare 
equality, and military victory.  
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Appendix17 
All Wars With Democratic States, 1816-2008 (Original and Updated)  
NOTE: Democracies are completely capitalized and in bold print. 
 
1. Mexican-American 1846-1848 
UNITED STATES defeats Mexico 
 
2. Roman Republic 1849 
FRANCE, The two Sicilies, and Austria-Hungary defeat the Papal States  
 
3. Crimean 1853-1856 
UNITED KINGDOM, France, Italy/Sardinia, and Turkey/Ottoman Empire defeat Russia 
 
4. Anglo-Persian 1856-1857 
UNITED KINGDOM defeats Iran/Persia 
 
5. Sino-French 1884-1885 
FRANCE defeats China 
 
6. Greco-Turkish 1897 
Turkey/Ottoman Empire defeats GREECE 
 
7. Boxer Rebellion 1900 
UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, Russia, and Japan defeat China 
 
8. Spanish-Moroccan 1909-1910 
SPAIN defeats Morocco 
 
9. First Balkan 1912-1913 
GREECE, Yugoslavia/Serbia, and Bulgaria defeat Turkey/Ottoman Empire 
 
10. Second Balkan 1913 
GREECE, Yugoslavia/Serbia, Turkey/Ottoman Empire, and Romania defeat Bulgaria 
 
11. First World War 1914-1918 
UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, GREECE, PORTUGAL, Belgium, 
Romania, Italy/Sardinia, Yugoslavia/Serbia, USSR/Russia, and Japan defeat Germany, Bulgaria, 
Austria-Hungary, and Turkey/Ottoman Empire 
 
12. Hungarian-Allies 1919 
                                                             
17
 Most of the Appendix information comes from Lake’s article and is presented in an organized and clear manner to 
enhance the overall study. The rest of the information, which is updated from Lake’s time period, comes from this 
study and other basic sources and citations given above.  
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA and Romania defeat Hungary 
13. Russo-Polish 1919-1920 
POLAND defeats USSR/Russia 
 
14. Russo-Finnish 1939-1940 
USSR/Russia defeats FINLAND 
 
15. Second World War 1939-1945 
UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, 
BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, SOUTH AFRICA, NORWAY, Poland, 
USSR/Russia, Greece, Yugoslavia/Serbia, China, Brazil, Ethiopia, and Mongolia defeat 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and FINLAND 
 
16. Palestine 1948 
ISRAEL defeats Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt/UAR, and Lebanon 
 
17. Sinai 1956 
ISRAEL, UNITED KINGDOM, and FRANCE defeat Egypt/UAR 
 
18. Sino-Indian 1962 
China defeats INDIA 
 
19. Second Kashmir 1965 
Pakistan defeats INDIA 
 
20. Vietnamese 1965-1975 
North Vietnam defeats UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 
PHILIPPINES, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia 
 
21. Six Day 1967 
ISRAEL defeats Egypt/UAR, Jordan, and Syria 
 
22. Football 1969 (sparked by a soccer game, though a number of other factors led up to it) 
EL SALVADOR defeats Honduras 
 
23. Bangladesh 1971 
INDIA defeats Pakistan 
 
24. Yom Kippur 1973 
ISRAEL defeats Egypt/UAR, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia 
 
25. Turko-Cypriot 1974 
TURKEY defeats Cyprus 
 
26. Falklands 1982 
UNITED KINGDOM defeats Argentina 
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Updated War List from 1982 to the Present 
 
27. Persian Gulf 1991 
UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, et al. defeat Iraq 
 
28. Bosnia 1995 
NATO (BELGIUM, CANADA, DENMARK, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, 
ICELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, 
SPAIN, TURKEY, UNITED STATES, and UNITED KINGDOM) defeats Yugoslavia/Serbia 
 
29. Kosovo 1999 
NATO (BELGIUM, CANADA, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, FRANCE, 
GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, 
NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, TURKEY, UNITED 
STATES, and UNITED KINGDOM) defeats Yugoslavia/Serbia 
 
30. Afghanistan 2001 
UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, et al. defeat Afghanistan 
 
31. Iraq 2003 
UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, et al. defeat Iraq 
 
 
General Statistics 
31 Total Wars 
26 Democratic Victories (84 percent) 
5 Democratic Losses (16 percent)—Greco-Turkish War (1897), Russo-Finnish War (1939-
1940), Sino-Indian War (1962), Second Kashmir War (1965), Vietnam War (1965-1975).  
 
168 War Participants 
Winners= 80 Democracies and 32 Autocracies 
Losers= 9 Democracies and 47 Autocracies (4 Democracies lost in the Vietnam War) 
 
The United States, the United Kingdom, and France have fought in 16 of the 31 wars, winning 
15 wars (the Vietnam War is the only loss for the United States). 
 
The United Kingdom has been the democracy in the most wars, with 12. The United States and 
France both have fought in 10 wars each. 
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